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Guerard and Sinkler: Public Corporations

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
THEODORE

B. GUERARD AND HUGER SINKLE*

Doctrine of Purprestures Misapplied
By far the most interesting case in the field of public corporations in many years was decided by the Supreme Court
of South Carolina in the period covered by this review. It is
the case of Sloa.n v. City of Greenville', The well written
opinion makes it extremely difficult to take issue with the
result. Nevertheless, long consideration of the decision has
resulted in the writers' opinion that the result is wrong. Such
a categoric statement demands specific reasons. Accordingly,
it is desirable to set forth the facts quite fully.
It appears that W. H. B. Simpson and John A. Ellison successfully sought permission from the City Council of Greenville to construct a five story, ten level parking building at
the intersection of West McBee Avenue and South Laurens
Street in such fashion that a portion of the building would
overhang West McBee Avenue and South Laurens, Street. The
overhang on South Laurens Street would commence about 12
feet above street level and extend out over the street for 8 feet.
The application had been duly considered by the Public Safety
Committee of the City Council of Greenville. This Committee
had held a public hearing and subsequently unanimously approved the issue of the' permit. The matter was taken up
before City Council in public meeting and Council likewise
gave consent to the project and by its action directed that
the permit be given to Simpson and Ellison which would permit the construction of the parking building with the overhang described above. The action here was brought by. the
Plaintiff, Sloan, as a taxpayer, citizen, resident and user of
the streets in the City of Greenville. Thus, it will be seen that
he had no special right affected which formed the basis of his
action and that he proceeded only as a member of the general
public. This fact has considerable significance. It also does
not appear that the use of the streets by the plaintiff and the
public could possibly be affected except perhaps for esthetic
reasons.
*Sinkler, Gibbs and Simons.
1. 235 S. C. 277, 111 S. E. 2d 573 (1959).
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The question for decision in the case was whether the City
Council of Greenville had authority to permit the area above
the streets to be so encroached by private persons. In the
course of deciding the matter, the Court concluded that since
the lands had been dedicated to the public for street use only,
the City of Greenville had no power by contract, ordinance
or permit to allow the street to be used for a purpose other
than public. In so doing, the Court brushed aside a statute
which seems to specifically and clearly give to the City Council
the power to permit an encroachment of this sort.
The CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA Section 47-61
(1952) reads as follows:
The city and town councils of the cities and towns of the
State shall, in addition to the powers conferred by their
respective charters, have power and authority to make,
ordain and establish all such rules, bylaws, regulations
and ordinances, not inconsistent with the laws of this
State, respecting the roads, streets, markets, police, health
and order of such cities and towns or respecting any subject as shall appear to them necessary and proper for the
security, welfare and convenience of such cities and
towns or for preserving health, peace, order and goad
government within them ; ...
This statute was enacted in 1896 and is the first general
law delegating to municipal councils powers to regulate streets,
etc. However, there is a definite reason why no general law
-waspassed at an earlier date. Until the adoption of the Constitution of 1895, all municipal corporations were chartered
by special act. The powers of each municipal corporation
therefore stemmed from special enactments. It was only by
reason of the mandate of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution that the general statute became necessary. Article
VIII, Section 1 provides:
The General Assembly shall provide by general laws for
the organization and classification of municipal corporations. The powers of each class shall be defined so that
no such corporation shall have any powers or be subjet
to any restrictions other than all corporations of thd
same class. Cities and towns now existing under special
charters may reorganize under the general laws of the
State, and when so reorganized their special charters shall
cease and determine.
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However, it is significant that the language in. the general
statute is of ancient origin. The City of Charleston was chartered by an Act of 1783. Its Charter contains a provision
giving its City Council the power to:
... make and establish such bye-laws, rules and ordinances, respecting the harbour, streets, lanes . . . that
shall appear to them requisite and necessary for the security, welfare and conveniency of said city...
Charters of other old towns are quite similar. The Charter
of the City of Georgetown, granted in 1803, contains this
provision:
that the said town council shall also have full power
to make and establish, and when they see fit, to alter all
such rules, by-laws and ordinances, respecting the harbor,
streets, lanes and alleys, public buildings, markets, . . .
and in general, every other by-law and regulation, that
shall appear to them requisite and necessary, for the
health, security, welfare, good government and convenience of the said town.
while the Charter of the City of Beaufort, granted in 1803,
contain almost identical language:
'.. they shall also be vested with full power and authority, from time to time, under their common seal, to make
and establish such by-laws, rules and regulations, respecting the harbor, streets, lanes, public buildings, workhouses, markets, . . and in general, every other by-law
or regulation that shall appear to them requisite and
necessary, for the security, welfare and convenience of
the said town, or for preserving peace, order and good
government with the same.
...

Now, there can be no doubt but that one who encroaches
upon a street or public highway without permission creates
the purpresture described by the Court, but the whole point
of the case is that the municipal councils in cities and towns
of South Carolina have for more than 200 years assumed that
they had the power to permit encroachments of the sort con,sidered by the Court in this case.
One has only to look about the City of Charleston to see
literally hundreds of purprestures. Two streets are spanned
by overhead thoroughfares which connect buildings upon the
opposite sides of the street. The Medical College Hospital is
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thus connected with the Medical College .classrooms and clinical departments. An important department store has buildings on the opposite sides of each street similarly connected.
The portico of St. Michaelrs Church, erected over 200 years
ago, extends completely over the sidewalk. Similar encroachments exist throughout Charleston. Indeed, one of the more
beautiful is a wrought iron balcony which ornaments the
charming home of a member of the Court who concurred in
the opinion here. Purprestures are not confined to the larger
cities. Almost every country town in South Carolina had its
general stores with a wooden shed of awning effect extending
over the sidewalk.
Thus, for almost 200 years those in charge of municipal
government thought that the plain language of a statutory
authorization "to make, ordain and establish all such rules,
bylaws, regulations and ordinances, not inconsistent with the
laws of this State, respecting the roads, streets, markets,
police, health and order of such cities and towns or respecting
any subject as shall appear to them necessary and proper for
the security, welfare and convenience of such cities and towns
or for preserving health, peace, order and good government
within them," gave them the power to permit encroachments
of this sort. Even if their assumptions were wrong, their
actions have been so widespread and so generally accepted that
the situation here demanded an application of the maxim:
communis errorfacit jus. Actually, however, there is a South
Carolina decision-afterwards discussed but overlooked in the
opinion-whose reasoning fully supports the action of the
City Council of Greenville..
It should be noted that the situation in this case did not
involve an encroachment unauthorized by the municipal authorities. It is not a case involving the complaint of a private
property owner who alleges special damages as a result of an
encroachment, authorized or unauthorized, or the closing of
a public street without the authorization of the Legislature.
Any one of these situations would have involved basic legal
rights and relationships essentially different from those involved in the case under review. Relief in such situations
might be granted in a proper case without impeaching the
basic principle whose application the writers feel should have
resulted in the denial of the relief sought in this case, to-wit:
that the encroachment permitted by municipal authorities was
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pursuant to the authorization of a state law, and therefore,
was not a purpresture.
It is hoped that no attempt will be made by members of
the public to remove the many "purprestures" which add so
much to the charm of our older cities. Charleston would hardly be Charleston if the lovely wrought iron balcony mentioned
earlier has to be removed.
During the course of its opinion, the Court overruled the
respondent's contention that the plaintiff had no capacity to
sue, stating that an objection of this sort had to be taken by
demurrer and was deemed to have been waived. Perhaps this
holding is correct but the whole point of the case is that the
plaintiff states no cause of action, and thus had no basis for
relief, and waiver by the respondent could not convert what
was not a cause of action into a basis for relief.
The case of Cherry v. Fewell,2 (Mayor of Rock Hill) supports the position of the City Council of Greenville. The litigation there resulted from action taken by the City Council
of Rock Hill in altering the route of Park Avenue in that
City, so that instead of passing through the grounds of what
is now Winthrop College, it would pass around those grounds.
The plaintiff owned a lot on Park Avenue at a distance beyond
the point of the street which had been re-routed, but brought
his action for injunctive and other relief upon the ground
that the action of the City Council of Rock Hill was without
lawful authority. The City defended upon the ground that
the special act incorporating the City of Rock Hill gave to
the City Council "full power and authority to open new streets
in said city, and close up, widen, or otherwise alter those now
in use, or which may hereafter be established, whensoever, in
their judgment, the same may be necessary for the improvement or convenience of said city .... "
The Court was careful to note that the plaintiff, Cherry,
had suffered no special damage, and therefore, his status was
one as a member of the public. The Court stated:
It is clear, therefore, that the injury of which plaintiff
complains is not that special or peculiar injury, differing
in kind, and not merely in degree, from that which the
public generally sustain, which alone would entitle a private person to maintain an action either for damages or
for an injuction in a case like this; for there is no alle2. 48 S. C. 553, 26 S. E. 798 (1897).
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gation that the plaintiff either has sustained or is likely
to sustain any injury of a special or peculiar character,
differing in kind from that to which every other person
entitled to use such street would be exposed in passing
to and fro over and along said street.
The Court held that the statutory authorization granted to
the City Council afforded ample authority for the action
taken, and therefore, concluded that since the plaintiff could
allege no special damage, he stated no cause of action.
Purprestures are not confined to encroachments. The word
"'purpresture' cometh of the French word 'pourprise,' which
signifieth a close, or enclosure; that is, where one encroacheth or maketh several to himself that which ought to be
common to many." Co. Litt. 277b; Co. Magna Charta, 38, 272.
(Most early cases dealing with purprestures involved actual
barricades across public ways.)
The similarity of the two situations is apparent. Cherry
had no special rights which were affected by the City of Rock
Hill's action in closing off a portion of what had been Park
Avenue,-so as to incorporate it within the campus of Winthrop
College. Nevertheless, if there had been no statutory authorization for that action it would have been unlawful and would
therefore have been a purpresture of which Cherry might
have complained. In the case here Sloan clearly had no special
damage, and notwithstanding the fact that the action taken
by the City Council of Greenville was pursuant to a statute
which gave to City Council the power to regulate the use of
public streets, he was permitted, as a member of the public,
who had suffered no special damage, to interfere with a very
proper use of power granted to the City Council of Greenville
by the general statute of the State.
The Court Refuses to Enlarge Statutory
Liability of Municipal Corporations
In two decisions handed down during the period under
review, the Court refused to enlarge the statutory liability of
municipal corporations.
The case ofMcKenzie v. City of Florence,3 was brought up
on appeal by the plaintiff from the order of the lower Court
sustaining the demurrers of the defendants, the city and the
surety company.
3. 234 S. C. 428, 108 S. E. 2d 825 (1959).
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The appellant in his complaint had alleged two causes of
action for alleged negligent, reckless, willful and wanton con'duct of the police officers of the defendant city in arresting
and imprisoning him. The complaint further alleged that the
action of the police officers represented failure on their part
to perform their duties as members of the Police Department
of the City of Florence and that he received serious and permanent injuries as a result thereof. The complaint further
alleged that a bond entered into between the defendant city
and the defendant surety company was issued for the benefit
of the public, including appellant.
In sustaining the city's demurrer, the Court reaffirmed the
principle that a municipal corporation cannot be sued in tort
in the absence of a statute granting such a right of action,
tracing the origin of this principle in South Carolina to the
1820 decision of Young v. Commissioners of Roads.4
The appellant contended that the defendant city had waived
its statutory immunity by taking out a fidelity bond (apparently pursuant to a City Ordinance) upon the policemen
allegedly committing the delicts complained of. On page 829
of the decision, the Court clearly holds that a municipal corporation cannot waive its immunity to tort liability in the
following language:
The City of Florence has oniy those powers prescribed
by the Constitution or the statute law of this State and
those necessarily are fairly implied or incident to the
powers expressly conferred. There is no statute in this
State that empowers a municipal corporation to waive
immunity to tort liability. Certainly it cannot be said
that the power of waiver is implied or incident to the
Constitution or statutory powers expressly conferred.
After this clear statement that the defendent city could
not waive its immunity to tort liability, it is difficult to understand why the opinion continued on with its discussion to
reach the conclusion on the following page: "That the City
of Florence did not waive its immunity by the purchase of
the bond in question."
After disposing of the question of the defendant city's immunity from tort liability, the opinion discussed at length the
question of whether the bond created a right of action by the
appellant against the surety company. Concluding that the
4. 2 Not &MecC. 537 (1820).
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bond was an indemnity only to the defendant city, the Court
refused to extend the surety's obligation beyond the express
terms of the bond, and sustained the surety company's demurrer.
Since the Court obviously intended to reaffirm the principle that a municipal corporation cannot waive its immunity
to tort liability without statutory authorization to do so, it
has unnecessarily weakened its holding on that point by its
additional discussion and finding that the City of Florence
did not in point of fact waive its immunity.
In this case the Court was again asked to overrule the
doctrine of municipal immunity in tort established by many
earlier decisions. Very properly the Court refused to do this
and reaffirmed its position set forth in the case of Rogers v.
Florence Printing Co., 5 that where a public policy exists, it
is for the Legislature and not the Court to revise or discard it.
In the case of Furr v. City of Rock HilU6 the plaintiY had
obtained a verdict in the lower court and the appeal was from
the lower court's refusal to grand a judgment n.o.v. In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court refused to enlarge
the liability of a municipality under the CODE OF LAWS OF
SOUTH CAROLINA Section 47-70 (1952), 7 to include injuries
suffered by a pedestrian from a fall occurring within a stadium area owned by the defendant city. The holding was
grounded on the finding that a plaintiff's injuries did not
occur on a street or public way maintained by the city.
This decision reaffirmed the Court's previous holdings in
the decisions cited therein that the liability of a municipality
under the statute in question is predicated upon it duties to
maintain its streets and other public ways in reasonable repair
for the purpose of travel thereon and that the words "immediately under the control of the corporation" do not enlarge
the field of liability beyond that purpose but relate to instrumentalities used in the maintenance and repair of streets for
the purpose of travel.
5. 233 S. C. 567, 106 S. E. 2d 258 (1958).

6. 235 S. C. 44, 109 S. E. 2d 697 (1959).
7. "Any person who shall receive bodily injury or damages in his person or property through a defect in any street, causeway, bridge or public
way or by reason of a defect or mismanagement of anything under control
of the corporation within the limits of any city or town may recover in an
action against such city or town the amount of actual damages sustained
by him by reason thereof if such person has not in any way brought about
any such injury or damage by his own negligent act or negligently contributed thereto ....

.
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In refusing to enlarge the scope of the statute as judiciously
construed in previous decisions, the Court again very properly
refused to trespass upon an area in which action, if to be
taken at all, should be done by the Legislature.
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